Europe’s migration crisis is not just a humanitarian emergency or a border control problem. It’s a strategic breakdown.
From the English Channel to Lampedusa, irregular migration continues to dominate headlines and decide elections.
The response thus far from many European capitals has been predictable: short-term containment measures, bilateral return agreements, and new offshore processing schemes.
And yet the flow continues, unabated and undeterred. Criminal networks that traffic in human lives adapt. Public pressure rises.
And the policies, in turn, grow more reactive.
To treat migration as a standalone issue is to miss a much broader point. Irregular migration is a symptom — not the disease.
The deeper problem lies in a fragmented European foreign policy, the erosion of state sovereignty in transit countries, and the pervasive influence of malign non-state actors in eastern Libya, led by the renegade general Haftar and his international backers (foremost among them Russia) who malevolently weaponise irregular migration to strong-arm European decision-makers on a range of critical issues —including the recognition of Haftar’s secessionist regime based in Benghazi.
Across north Africa and beyond, these forces have been quietly reshaping migration into an effective lever for political pressure.
In Libya, for example, irregular migration has not only become a source of illicit income for criminal networks — but it is also a strategic tool used by the authorities in the Haftar-controlled east to exert influence, extract concessions, or disrupt the European agenda.
These networks do not operate in isolation. They are often embedded in local structures and enjoy quiet backing from international players who see irregular migration as a bargaining chip — not a humanitarian concern.
Their goal is not stability, but leverage.
Equally concerning, is the European tendency to engage with these actors in good faith — despite their open disdain for political, legal and diplomatic norms, as well as ethical standards. This spectacle played out in full this month when an EU delegation was abruptly expelled from eastern Libya for the apparent crime of adhering to established diplomatic protocol.
Many of these Haftar-aligned groups have a lengthy rap sheet of human rights violations, autocratic behaviour, and disregard for international law.
While cooperation with such actors may be tempting for European policymakers eager to secure quick wins on migration and border security that placate domestic audiences, these efforts often amount to little more than window dressing.
The reason for this is clear: the Haftar-led regime and its loyalists lack any genuine commitment to democratic principles, human dignity, and legal accountability.
Their willingness to violate human rights, cooperate in abuses, or pursue agendas that undermine regional stability makes them unreliable and dangerous partners. Their actions are difficult to predict, and their goals more than often run counter to those of their European counterparts.
By engaging these forces sans preconditions or pressure, Europe risks further entrenching them – and turning the serious humanitarian crisis of migration into an exploitable political tool, increasingly used to blackmail and coerce European states and institutions.
This is not just a policy failure. It is a strategic vulnerability. Unless Europe urgently reconsiders whom it empowers and on what terms, irregular migration will continue to escalate – not simply as a movement of people – but as a symptom of geopolitical exploitation and structural disorder.
The result is chaos. Libya, like other transit states, bears the burden of this political ambiguity. Non-regulatory migration continues to grow, and with tragic human consequences. Smuggling routes expand inland while migrants and refugees are left vulnerable to extortion, violence, and exploitation.
European engagement remains focused on border control and externalisation. Proposals like the Rwanda model reflect the desire to contain the issue offshore –— to move people — not solve problems. But as we’ve seen time and again — such deals — however politically useful, rarely survive legal or logistical scrutiny.
What is needed is a shift in mindset, from reaction to strategy, from containment to cooperation.
If Europe is serious about addressing irregular migration, four changes are essential:
1. Build real alternatives to irregular migration
Deterrence cannot work without alternatives. Safe pathways, such as those piloted through Safe Mobility Offices in Latin America, should be replicated in north Africa. These can divert irregular flows by offering legal entry for asylum, work, or family reunification.
2. Break with complicity
Europe must cease dealing with actors who profit from people smuggling and border disorder as security partners. A clean break from engaging with illegitimate authorities — such as those in eastern Libya — combined with sustained political and economic pressure on subversive parallel state structures, is key to safeguarding Libyan state sovereignty, which in turn is essential to restoring border security.
3. Redefine UK-EU cooperation
Post-Brexit paralysis on migration must end. A UK-EU admissions agreement rooted in shared responsibility – not unilateral returns — would help rebuild cooperation and restore credibility in clear, legal migration pathways.
4. Invest in returns and reintegration
Voluntary repatriation programs remain vastly underused and underfunded. Europe and the UK must align funding to support returns that are humane, supported by reintegration services, and tied to development incentives for countries of origin.
If Europe is to regain control of its migration policy, it must first regain clarity in its strategy. Irregular migration is not just a movement of people — it is a reflection of how Europe engages with the world, and how the world responds in turn.
The solution lies not in building higher walls or signing risk-shifting deals, but in crafting partnerships based on accountability, long-term interests, and mutual respect.
The time for fragmented fixes is over. What is needed now is a coordinated vision — one that sees migration not as a threat to contain — but as a reality to govern wisely and humanely.
This year, we turn 25 and are looking for 2,500 new supporting members to take their stake in EU democracy. A functioning EU relies on a well-informed public – you.
Walid Ellafi is minister of communication and political affairs for the state of Libya.
Walid Ellafi is minister of communication and political affairs for the state of Libya.