The newly released U.S. National Security Strategy portrays migration as a threat of civilisational erasure for Europe. I reject that framing. But it is a reminder of how quickly anxieties about democracy can be turned into divisive security narratives when democratic trust weakens.
Everywhere I go in Europe, I hear the same thing: democracy is in danger. People say it’s too slow. Too complicated. It won’t make us safe. And many are losing patience.
All this comes as Europe is rearming on a scale not seen since the Cold War, an odd moment for our American ally to call Europe “weak.” This rearmament puts the continent on a collision course between rising militarisation and declining democratic trust.
Where will we be in ten years’ time?
The danger is not Europe’s rearmament. That’s necessary. A more aggressive Russia and a less engaged America leave us no choice.
In a Europe of heavily armed states but shrinking democracies, the real risk is that extremist parties could gain control of strong armies with no one to stop them.
The findings of my last annual report leave little doubt:
Elections are becoming easier to influence and harder to trust. Disinformation, foreign interference and AI-driven manipulation now shape debates long before people vote. We saw it in the recent parliamentary elections in Czechia and the Republic of Moldova.
Free voices are under pressure, too. Journalists face threats. Peaceful protesters face excessive force. Civic space is shrinking under new so-called “foreign influence” laws. And courts are being pulled into politics, including the European Court of Human Rights.
European security is a nexus of defence policy, fiscal choices and democratic resilience.
For decades, Europe lowered its guard, believing stability, diplomacy and the US security umbrella would hold. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine ended that illusion. A third of Russia’s state budget now goes to the military, while Washington’s priorities lay bare Europe’s security dependencies.
Across the continent, defence spending is rising fast. Germany is investing €650 billion over five years, France €413 billion through 2030, and the UK is heading to 2.6 percent of GDP. Poland is already at 4.5 percent, the highest in NATO. And the European Commission’s €800 billion defence investment plan speaks for itself.
Meeting this moment requires strengthening Europe’s democratic security. Military power only protects a democracy if democracy remains strong enough to control it.
Real security begins with institutions people can trust: independent courts, transparent elections, clear limits on emergency powers, and free media able to challenge those in power.
It also means building a security architecture that protects us from cyberattacks, terrorism and foreign information manipulation and interference, beyond the outdated divide between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security. As new MI6 chief Blaise Metreweli recently put it, today’s frontline runs online, on our streets and on our screens.
Several member states have already documented covert influence operations targeting elections, political parties and public institutions. We are developing practical tools to help governments respond to disinformation and manipulation, because a democracy that cannot protect its information environment will struggle to protect its institutions.
Democratic security puts our values at the heart of Europe’s security architecture. It’s our first line of defence.
Ukraine makes this clear. As the country fights for its survival, we are helping to reinforce the democratic institutions that will guide its recovery, from judicial independence and free and fair elections to anti-corruption reforms and resilient public institutions. These are the foundations of any democratic reconstruction.
In democracies, the instruments of force belong to the constitutional order, not to the government of the day. Elected leaders only exercise that power for a time, and always under the limits set by the constitution. That’s the difference. When these safeguards weaken, force can be redirected with alarming speed.
We have seen it before. In Weimar Germany in the early 1930s, extremists captured the police, intelligence services and even a restricted army within months.
The politicisation of armies and paramilitary forces in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s led to devastating violence. And in recent years, prolonged emergency powers and politicised security forces have weakened checks and balances without changing constitutions or elections.
Europe needs a shared approach to democratic security, matching the urgency it brings to military security.
This is not an argument for slowing rearmament. It is a call to ensure that our democratic institutions remain strong enough to control the power we are rebuilding.
One future is rearmament without democratic renewal. Defence budgets rise, social pressure builds, and trust declines. Extremist parties enter government. Others drift toward illiberalism. Europe strengthens its defence industry, supports Ukraine, and reinforces NATO, yet moves slowly on oversight and constitutional control. Power grows faster than accountability. People support deterrence, but doubt that institutions listen to them.
Another future is within reach: rearmament matched by democratic security. Military power grows while remaining bound to constitutional limits. Parliaments exercise oversight. Courts stay independent. Civil society and the media remain free to scrutinise authority. Strategic power strengthens the rule of law instead of undermining it.
For too long, Europe has debated security as if military power and democratic strength belonged to separate worlds. That distinction no longer fits the Europe we live in.
In an era of rearmament and democratic decline, military power is only as credible and safe as the democratic institutions that command it, constrain it, and make it legitimate.
Ensuring that the power Europe is rebuilding never turns against its own people and their freedoms is now central to Europe’s security. This is more than a choice. It’s the work we must finish.
Alain Berset is Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
Alain Berset is Secretary General of the Council of Europe.